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11. African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century 
Gérard Prunier 
 
Africa was decolonized between 1956 and 1975, with the bulk of African states reaching 
independence during the 1960s. Since then, Africa has become—and remains today—the most 
violence-prone of the five continents. In spite of that fact, African wars are often understudied and 
considered negligible. When the Rwandan Genocide burst upon international attention in 1994, few 
people seemed to realize that it was the consequence of a war that had been going on for three-and-
a-half years. And when a war involving 14 states eventually broke out in central Africa in 1996 as a 
result of that genocide, and lasted six years, it barely seemed to affect international opinion, even 
though it was the most murderous conflict since World War Two. A terrorist attack in Europe or 
Israel immediately makes the headlines even if only a handful of victims die. But hundreds or even 
thousands can die in Africa without making it to the front pages of newspapers. This is due to a 
mixture of racism, lack of perceived strategic significance, and cultural isolation. But all these factors 
are now changing, and African conflicts in the future will tend to become more and more relevant to 
the way the world works, and how it looks at itself. 
In this essay we will be placing ourselves in a perspective where, out of the four possibilities outlined 
in the NIC’s Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: The Defense Implications of Emerging Global Trends report,  we 
will consider a combination of two of the global trends presented: a rise in non-state networks and a 
fragmented international system. The one scenario we cannot see as relevant overall is the concert of 
powers, a choice it would take too long to justify within the framework of such a short paper. As for 
the possibility of seeing a return to great power confrontation, even though it may be a more 
realistic systemic possibility than the emergence of a global concern, it is hard to foresee significant 
great power confrontation arising in Africa. The emerging powers, particularly China, will not fight 
for Africa. Even if this trend occurs—and we cannot see it dominate—it will most probably create 
conditions similar to those of the 19th century. The Soviet Union’s Vladimir Lenin was sure that an 
inter-imperialist war would come out of colonial competition in Africa.1 It did not, and when the 
great inter-imperialist war came, it came out of a European confrontation. If renewed great power 
rivalry were to bring about a major military confrontation in the 21st century, the trigger is much 
more likely to be found in the Middle Eastern or Asia than in Africa. 
 
The way it used to be 
African conflicts in the 20th century started from a combination of causes, some of which were 
specific to the continent, while others pertained to the Cold War environment. Specific causes had 
to do with: 
• Administrative and political weakness of the states. 
• Absence of a coherent, long-standing national cohesion, the African “countries” being, in fact, 
arbitrarily cut chunks of the continent, parceled out according to prevailing relationships among 
the colonizing powers. 
• As a consequence, the main problem was the coexistence of tribes with varying degrees of access 
to modernity (depending on colonial policies), different size, different cultures and economic 
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 weight, leading to the dominance of some of them over others and to the exacerbation of 
previous relationship of hostility or exploitation. A common “national” good was an abstract 
notion. There was the good of one’s tribe and, within that precinct, the good of one’s clan or 
family. The “nation” remained an abstract point of reference, used in dealing with the non-
African world. 
• This situation of institutional weakness and lack of coherence was exacerbated by the fact that 
politics, i.e., the control of the state apparatus, was the only way to achieve riches and status. 
There was no entrepreneurial class worth the name (only traders) and, even for those in 
business, the state was the key factor to obtain foreign currency, lucrative public contracts, and 
preferential access to raw materials. The state was the key to everything and, as a result, fighting 
for its control was the main concern of politics. 
• Politicians with a realistic view were few and far between. Those who had one were, in general, 
anti-colonialist ideologues who resented the short shrift their communities had been given by 
the former colonial masters. They tended to point the politics of their new countries toward an 
“anti-imperialist” line hostile to both the US and the former colonial powers alike. 
• Because of colonial education policies, the public had been kept broadly ignorant of political 
issues. It was, therefore, easy prey for demagogues and military dictators, such as Idi Amin Dada 
and Bokassa. Rational politicians, such as Julius Nyerere and Tom Mboya, had a hard time. 
• As a result, most African wars, if not all, until the massive Central African Wars of the 1990s, 
were civil wars.  
All these factors played out against a Cold War background. Local quarrels were immediately probed 
to see who was a “Communist” or Communist ally, which were considered the same, and who was 
“a friend of the West.” As a result, the strangest judgments were passed. Patrice Lumumba was 
dubbed a Communist because he was anti-colonialist and the US saw Belgium as a close and 
necessary ally, while Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was toasted as a “friend of the West” in spite of his 
brutal and thieving dictatorship. France supported a series of abominable dictators because they 
were des amis de la France, and France had been subcontracted for the anti-communist control of 
Francophone Africa by the United States. Conflicts in such cases—or political repression, two sides 
of the same coin—were practically on automatic: the pro-Western camp being awarded immediate 
support by Paris or Washington while Moscow supported the “anti-capitalist” side. “Anti-
imperialism” could produce strange policies on the Soviet side as well, such as praising Somali 
dictator Siad Barre for his “socialism” when he did not know what the word meant, and supporting 
General Idi Amin Dada for his alleged “anti-imperialism” when he expelled the Indian communities 
from Uganda.  
As a rule, African conflicts were rooted in local problems and grievances (about which neither the 
West nor the Communists usually had any clear understanding), and tended to escalate, or at least 
continue unabated, as the contestants sought to align themselves with one side or the other in the 
Cold War as a means of seeking outside support. There were some ambiguous cases, such as 
Nigeria’s Biafran war of the late 1960s, where Great Britain and the Soviet Union ended up as 
uneasy allies of the Federal Government, while Portugal and France supported the secessionists.2 
But such ambiguities tended to be the exception, not the rule. 
Such conflicts achieved no lasting results because they were linked to, and partially caused by, 
ineffectual development policies. These kept the tribal gaps open, did not provide African societies 
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 with power bases independent from the state, and kept the local economies subject to foreign 
interests. These acted as boosters to the state’s interests, therefore making its conquest all the more 
attractive.  
Grand ideological narratives acted both as camouflage and as mobilizing factors for the fighters and 
for their civilian constituencies. The conflicts were deeply local, even at times sub-national. They 
typically involved large numbers of combatants. Most conflicts were financed and equipped by one 
of the two Cold War blocs or by their local proxies. The weaponry tended to be relatively simple or 
even makeshift. The media provided very little coverage for these conflicts, which, in contrast to 
conflicts in Asia, Latin America or the Middle East, did not usually inflame world opinion. The 
protracted civil conflict in South Africa, which never broke into open warfare, was the only one that 
proved capable of mobilizing Western public opinion, because one of its contending parties was 
white and could thus provide a locus for foreign identification, be it “the defense of freedom” (US) 
or “the brutality of racism” (USSR).  
 
The new dispensation 
The end of the Cold War had a massive impact on African conflicts. After 1989, the rules of the 
game changed:  
• The one-party state, which had been the rule whether it dubbed itself “progressive” or promoted 
a form of right-wing Leninism, suddenly became obsolete.3 “Democracy” became the order of 
the day and, just as the one-party state had mimicked Bolshevism, new systems appeared to be 
mimicking Western multi-party democracy. But this was without any of the social, economic, or 
cultural factors actually underpinning democracies elsewhere. The Rwandan Genocide was one 
of the unwarranted consequences of this “democratization without a democratic base.” 
• Fitting this new political dispensation, human rights became a new ideological norm. The human 
rights bandied about by the “new democracies” often had no more reality than the “socialism” 
previously displayed by “progressive” regimes. But a ritual homage was now paid to the concept 
of elections, even if they were flawed and even if the contenders did not represent any clear 
democratic alternative to whomever they were pitted against. 
• Democratic paraphernalia, especially when it was used by a regime that had recently replaced an 
obviously autocratic one, was often sufficient to gain worldwide acceptance. The conflicts of 
these new “democracies” with either their internal opposition or their neighbors, were usually 
looked upon with benevolence by Western opinion. When these “new democracies” violated the 
dominant human rights ideology, they tended to be only mildly reprimanded. Rwanda under 
President Paul Kagame became a prime example of this aspect of the new dispensation. 
• Grand narrative ideologies, usually a variety of socialism but at times hyper-nationalism or some 
form of ethnic fundamentalism, waned and faded away.  
• Open declarations of ethnicity as a political marker started to regress, due to the unifying 
influence of modern media and growing urbanization. But where it persisted, it did so under the 
guise of “pride,” “roots,” and “cultural heritage,” an Africanized version of political correctness. 
Post-Apartheid South Africa exemplified this trend. 
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 • Conversely, the importance of religion grew, particularly in the case of Islam. But this trend also 
affected Christianity. Protestant fundamentalism, often supported by US churches, began to 
challenge both Islam and older established forms of Christianity. This has particularly been the 
case in Ethiopia where the Pentacostal churches bit deeply into täwahädo “orthodox” territory. 
Religious violence grew apace.  
• Syncretic cults and witchcraft movements (re)appeared, recycling elements of larger religions 
into a semi-coherent body, allowing them to win or browbeat converts and marshal them to 
action. The best-known example of this phenomenon is the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army, 
an initially Ugandan cult, whose members later migrated to Southern Sudan, the Northeastern 
Congo, and finally the Central African Republic.  
• The media started to cover African conflicts a bit more seriously, though global coverage 
remained far behind that of contemporary wars in the Middle East or South Asia.  
• As a result of this deeper coverage, it became possible for smaller armed groups to have an 
influence far beyond what their numbers would otherwise have allowed. Guerilla movements 
were re-designated as “terrorist groups,” i.e., the case of the Afar and the Somali in Ethiopia, as 
were bandits with a thin ideological veneer, such as al-Qaida au Mahgreb Islamique (AQMI) in 
the Sahel. Given the American fixation on terrorism following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, “terrorist” became an oversimplified, catch-all category in which to fit armed movements 
nobody understood too clearly. African states lobbied to get their enemies put on the terrorist 
list in order to attract additional aid, while rebels accused states of carrying out repressive 
policies against so-called terrorists. The net result has been a general overestimation of the 
relevance of terrorist attacks, such as the May 2011 bombing in Marrakech, Morocco.  
• These smaller armed movements, at times, still had foreign sponsors. But the acceleration and 
greater ease of transport, even in very remote places, enabled the movements to capitalize on 
local natural resources. The new global market provided them with ready customers who could 
operate through various shadow companies and recycle their money in tax havens. Armed 
movements patterned their logistics on those of the drug gangs and, at times, the two could 
meet. This gave armed movements a degree of freedom from foreign sponsors that they had not 
previously enjoyed and also made the complete mavericks more dangerous, since they did not 
have to satisfy the minimum requirements of organizing around an ideology or political stance. 
• The spread of information technology also allowed for greater coordination between disparate 
groups that could make, or later break, tactical alliances with an ease their forerunners did not 
enjoy. 
• The role of popular feeling in political mobilization increased even as use of ideological frames 
decreased. This emotional attraction was a raw, gut product of a world, which was trusting 
political philosophy less and less and feelings more and more. Popular feeling tended to be re-
packaged as human rights and in cultural terms, which substituted for the obsolete 
ideology/ethnicity previously used. The transformation of the militant Oromo Liberation Front 
in Ethiopia over the years is very revealing from is point of view. 
• These lighter and more nimble forms of conflict opened up avenues not previously used for 
violent action, such as hostage taking, sexual violence, and the displacement of refugees. These 
forms of action depended on media coverage, which would not have been afforded previously, 
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 but which was now more readily available for these violent repertoires than for “classical” armed 
action, both because of a shift in contemporary sensibilities toward a greater concern with 
human rights made them more distasteful for public opinion, and because they were less 
dangerous for the reporters covering them. 
• Low-technology weapons persisted and became even more readily available than they had been 
in the past, since transport was easier and the former USSR, in economic ruins in the 1990s, 
provided a cheap and almost unlimited supply of small arms. High-technology weapons wielded 
by better-equipped armed forces only had a moderate advantage over their older counterparts, 
because they were (a) expensive and, therefore, less easily available; (b) fragile, hence dependent 
on a sophisticated chain of maintenance not readily available in Africa; and (c) complicated to 
operate properly, thus not easy to pass on to friendly local militias, whose members were often 
technologically illiterate. 
But a number of features persisted: 
• The African continent’s balance did not grow any stronger. Some of its technological and 
administrative capacities were strengthened. But this was more than offset by the rise in power 
of non-state actors, such as religious groups, civil society organizations, ethnically organized 
militias, opinion pressure groups, and bandits, which increasingly usurped the powers of the 
state. Some were still practicing the old game of trying to remove the state and replace it with 
their own power. But others preferred to take the shortcut of acquiring wealth, power, and 
privilege directly, rather than using the peripheral and more complicated road of regime change.  
• As a result of persistent state weakness, salaries were often not paid to the agents of the state, 
thereby facilitating the challenges non-state groups could pose. 
• Africa’s armed forces tended to remain unprofessional, undertrained in the use of modern 
weapons, and politically divided in their loyalties. It, accordingly, remained difficult for the state 
to retain its monopoly of legitimate violence, since it possessed neither the legitimacy nor 
controlled the violence. The worst Africa case today is probably the Forces Armées de la République 
du Congo (FARDC), the DRC’s “army.” This force is probably more dangerous to its own 
population than several of the non-state actors it is supposed to fight in the Kivus.  
 
The global overview 
It is clear from what we have just read that the dominant situation in Africa is likely to be the 
continued growth of non-state networks, which would be made easier by a fragmented international 
system. The Central African wars may prove a portent of things to come, and are a perfect example 
of this situation.4 For all its appetite for African raw materials, China is unlikely to fight a big 
international war over them.5 Rivalry over raw materials is likely to remain muted and under the 
horizon, mostly because the African states do not have the capacity to become autonomous enough 
to force the hand of their protector/driver/minder, as do, at least, some states in Asia and the 
Middle East.6 As a result, atomization and localism will remain characteristic of African conflicts. 
And solutions, to the extent that they exist, will remain extremely specific. There cannot be a one-size-
fits-all approach to African warfare. But some recommendations can be made here for the benefit of 
US forces.  
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 • For use in Africa, US forces are over-equipped and too heavy. Their logistics are enormous and 
preclude use in heavy terrain. In many ways, operations would be easier if their gear was closer 
to what was used in the Pacific theater during the Second World War or even the Vietnam War.  
• Conversely, US forces are politically and culturally underprepared. Their behavior often grates 
on local sensibilities, particularly in Muslim-majority areas. A volunteer army should allow for 
better preparation for operations in culturally different terrain.  
• Mobility in Africa is very much the heart of the matter, particularly when faced with an enemy 
that neither looks nor feels like a conventional army, i.e., the case of AQMI in the Sahel or what 
could have happened in the case of an intervention in Darfur, where the janjaweed looked like 
“normal” camel nomads.  
• Mobility in Africa means good, old-fashioned mobility on foot. Helicopters are fine for combat 
support but not for transport where their noise is too easily detected from a great distance. In 
many ways, African warfare is and will remain archaic for the foreseeable future.  
• Cultural adaptation to the context on the ground should not only be defensive, it should also 
allow for the possibility to use the counterforce of groups that are opposed to the ones the US is 
fighting. But such choices have to be thoroughly investigated. The April 2006 CIA-sponsored 
coup in Somalia, supporting a highly unpopular warlord alliance, was a massive error that was 
due to a poor assessment of the internal political situation in that country. Incorrect analysis, in 
turn, was due to poor intelligence gathering. 
In any case, African situations will remain a secondary feature on the world stage. No African 
country is equipped with nuclear weapons, and no African country has the capacity or the will to 
brutally intrude on the world scene and use a form of violent blackmail to bend local geopolitics to 
its desired views. The one form of quasi-violent tactics Africa could use to capture the world’s 
attention is disease epidemic and/or migrant invasion. Disease and the migration of masses of poor 
people could be considered Africa’s nuclear bombs. HIV-AIDS came out of Africa, and the present 
North African revolutions-cum-civil-wars triggering large refugee flows are viewed as a direct threat 
to the northern Mediterranean shores.7 But, can we see these threats as likely to be managed by a 
hostile political force or are they just the uncontrollable consequence of political spontaneous 
combustion? In many ways, such threats are closer to natural catastrophes than to warfare as 
normally understood. 
                                                
1 He based this view on events such as the Franco-German tension over Morocco and the near-war situation after the 
Fashoda incident in the Sudan in 1898.  
2 When the Federals won, they chose to ally themselves solidly with the US. 
3 The ideal type of right-wing Leninism had been Mobutu’s MPR.  
4 See Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford 
University Press America. 2009. 
5 Beijing’s attitude concerning the 2011 Southern Sudanese secession is typical of this.  
6 No African country, not even South Africa, has the capacity for dangerous autonomy displayed by Israel, Iran, 
Pakistan, or even Afghanistan.  
7 Back in 1987, when working in the presidential African unit in Paris, I heard then-Senegalese President Abdou Diouf 
voice this possibility, adding bitterly that, given Africa’s weakness, this was its last weapon.  
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